

1 SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
 David W. Carpenter*
 2 Bradford A. Berenson*
 David L. Lawson*
 3 Edward R. McNicholas*
 Eric A. Shumsky #206164
 4 1501 K Street, N.W.
 Washington, DC 20005
 Tel: (202) 736-8000
 5 Fax: (202) 736-8711
 bberenson@sidley.com

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
 HALE AND DORR LLP
 Randolph D. Moss*
 Samir C. Jain # 181572
 Brian M. Boynton # 222193
 Catherine M.A. Carroll*
 1875 Pennsylvania Ave, N.W.
 Washington, DC 20006
 Tel.: (202) 663-6000
 Fax: (202) 663-6363
 randolph.moss@wilmerhale.com

WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY
 LLP
 Brendan V. Sullivan, Jr. *
 John G. Kester
 Gilbert Greenman
 725 Twelfth Street, N.W.
 Washington, DC 20005
 Tel.: (202) 434-5000
 Fax: (202) 434-5029
 jkester@wc.com

Attorneys for the Sprint Defendants

7 PILLSBURY WINTHROP
 SHAW PITTMAN LLP
 8 Bruce A. Ericson #76342
 Jacob R. Sorensen #209134
 9 Marc H. Axelbaum #209855
 50 Fremont Street
 10 Post Office Box 7880
 San Francisco, CA 94120
 11 Tel.: (415) 983-1000
 Fax: (415) 983-1200
 12 bruce.ericson@pillsburylaw.com

MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON
 LLP
 Henry Weissmann # 132418
 Susan R. Szabo # 155315
 Aimee A. Feinberg # 223309
 355 South Grand Avenue
 35th Floor
 Los Angeles, CA 90071
 Tel.: (213) 683-9100
 Fax: (213) 683-5150
 henry.weissmann@mto.com

* admitted pro hac vice

13 Attorneys for AT&T Corp.

Attorneys for the Verizon Defendants

14
 15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
 16 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

17 IN RE:)
)
 18 NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY)
 TELECOMMUNICATIONS RE-)
 19 CORDS LITIGATION)
)
 20 This Document Relates To All Cases)
 Except:)
 21 *Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v.*)
Bush, No. 07-00109; Center for Consti-)
 22 *tutional Rights v. Bush, No. 07-01115;*)
Guzzi v. Bush, No. 06-06225; Shubert v.)
 23 *Bush, No. 07-00693; Clayton v. AT&T*)
Comm'ns of the Southwest, No. 07-)
 24 *01187; United States v. Adams, No. 07-*)
01323; United States v. Clayton, No. 07-)
 25 *01242; United States v. Palermino, No.*)
07-01326; United States v. Rabner, No.)
 26 *07-01324; United States v. Volz, No. 07-*)
01396)
 27)
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MDL NO. 06-1791 VRW

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIER DEFENDANTS IN SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES' MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [Dkt. 559]

Courtroom: 6, 17th Floor
 Judge: Hon. Vaughn R. Walker

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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

This Court has sought supplemental briefing on whether § 802 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FISAAA), Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436) constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Executive Branch. *See* Order (Feb. 11, 2009), Dkt. 559. For the reasons set forth below and in our opening brief (Dkt. 508 at 10–14), it does not.

Only twice in our Nation’s history has the Supreme Court struck down a statute as an impermissible delegation of legislative authority to the Executive Branch, both times in 1935. *See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States*, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); *Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan*, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). We have found only one court of appeals ever to have done so, and its decision was vacated and the statute subsequently upheld. *See South Dakota v. Dep’t of Interior*, 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995), *vacated by* 519 U.S. 919 (1996), *and repudiated by* 423 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2005). This is with good reason.

The nondelegation doctrine operates within a narrow domain: It does not apply at all unless Congress has sought to delegate legislative power, such as the power to engage in certain rulemaking. Here, no legislative power is at issue. Section 802 merely calls for the Attorney General to invoke a statutory immunity by presenting facts to the Court in a particular case, not to promulgate a prospective, generally applicable rule. Such an action does not involve legislative power or implicate the nondelegation doctrine.

Moreover, even when the nondelegation doctrine does apply, its demands are modest: A statute is constitutional so long as Congress “lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.” *J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States*, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). Courts reject nondelegation challenges when, as here, the Executive Branch’s exercise of discretion operates within a limited field or is cabined by the application of congressionally determined criteria. Courts uniformly have rejected nondelegation challenges to statutes that provide such minimal guidance as that the official should act “in the public interest,” or to prevent impairment of “national security.” *E.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States*, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943); *New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States*, 287 U.S. 12, 24–

1 25 (1932); *Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.*, 426 U.S. 548, 559 (1976). This re-
2 quirement is even more relaxed in areas of traditional executive authority, such as national security
3 and foreign affairs.

4 The requisite intelligible principle is present here. Section 802(a) specifies in detail the crite-
5 ria that must be satisfied for the Attorney General to file a certification. These criteria provide all
6 the congressional guidance that is needed to sustain the law, which applies only in the narrow do-
7 main of lawsuits alleging the “provi[sion of] assistance to an element of the intelligence commu-
8 nity.” FISAAA § 802(a). These criteria are sufficient even if the Attorney General has discretion
9 regarding whether to file a certification if the criteria are met. Scores of laws similarly *authorize*,
10 but do not *compel*, executive action upon the satisfaction of designated statutory criteria. And nu-
11 merous cases—including at least four decisions by the Supreme Court—have upheld laws of this
12 type against nondelegation challenges.

13 Moreover, the modest guidance required from Congress need not be explicit in the statutory
14 text; a court must consider “the ‘purpose of the Act, its factual background, and the statutory con-
15 text.’” *TOMAC v. Norton*, 433 F.3d 852, 866 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (*quoting American Power & Light*
16 *Co. v. SEC*, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946)). Here in particular, we know for certain the motivating pur-
17 poses that Congress embodied in § 802. Congress embarked on two years of study and debate of the
18 circumstances under which litigation against telecommunications providers alleged to have assisted
19 the government should proceed—including *this litigation in particular*. It ultimately concluded that
20 granting immunity to companies that either did not provide the assistance alleged, or provided any
21 assistance in good faith, would enhance the nation’s security by ensuring that private parties cooper-
22 ate in intelligence activities in the future, and by preventing the disclosure of classified information.
23 *See S. Rep. No. 110–209*, at 9-12 (2007). This statutory purpose and the context in which § 802 was
24 adopted—in which Congress anticipated that the Attorney General would file certifications in these
25 very lawsuits—provide further guidance still.

26 If, however, the Court concludes that § 802 is constitutionally doubtful, any such doubt
27 should be remedied by interpreting the statute as *requiring* the Attorney General to issue a certifica-
28 tion if he determines the statutory criteria are satisfied. The statute is silent as to whether the Attor-

1 ney General is required to file a certification when the specified prerequisites are met; it specifies the
2 consequences that follow “if” the Attorney General issues a certification, *see* FISAAA § 802(a), but
3 does not expressly state whether the Attorney General may or must issue a certification upon making
4 the relevant findings. The statute does, however, make clear that the Attorney General has not just
5 authorities but “duties” under the provision, *see id.* § 802(e), and case law holds that in some cir-
6 cumstances even apparently discretionary actions must be taken if necessary to vindicate the rights
7 of the public or third parties. Interpreting § 802 to require the Attorney General to file a certification
8 if he determines the criteria of § 802(a) are met is thus a permissible construction of the provision,
9 which must be adopted if necessary to avoid constitutional doubt.

10 **I. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE IS INAPPOSITE BECAUSE § 802 DOES NOT**
11 **AUTHORIZE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO MAKE LAW**

12 Article I of the Constitution vests in Congress “[a]ll legislative powers herein granted.”
13 “From this language the Court has derived the nondelegation doctrine: that Congress may not consti-
14 tutionally delegate its legislative power to another branch of Government.” *Touby v. United States*,
15 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991). As the text of Article I and the Supreme Court’s formulation of the doc-
16 trine make clear, the nondelegation doctrine does not apply every time Congress confers *any* power
17 on another branch, but only when Congress attempts to delegate *legislative* power. *See, e.g., Whit-*
18 *man v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc.*, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“In a delegation challenge, the consti-
19 tutional question is whether the statute has delegated *legislative* power to the agency.” (emphasis
20 added)); *Loving v. United States*, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1995) (“The fundamental precept of the delega-
21 tion doctrine is that the *lawmaking* function belongs to Congress . . . and may not be conveyed to
22 another branch or entity” (emphasis added)); *J.W. Hampton*, 276 U.S. at 406 (“[I]t is a breach
23 of the national fundamental law if Congress gives up its *legislative* power and transfers it to the
24 President, or to the Judicial branch.” (emphasis added)).

25 Accordingly, “the first step in assessing whether a statute delegates legislative power is to
26 determine what authority the statute confers.” *Whitman*, 531 U.S. at 465. If Congress vests an
27 agency with quasi-legislative power, such as the power to engage in rulemaking, it must “lay down
28 by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed

1 to conform.” *J.W. Hampton*, 276 U.S. at 409.¹ When, by contrast, Congress merely authorizes an
 2 agency to take executive, administrative, or other nonlegislative action, the nondelegation doctrine is
 3 inapposite and Congress need not provide an intelligible principle. *See, e.g., United States v. Allen*,
 4 160 F.3d 1096, 1108 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[T]his case does not involve a delegation of legislative au-
 5 thority; thus, the ‘intelligible principle’ language . . . is not relevant.”); *see also Knauff v. Shaugh-*
 6 *nessy*, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (“[T]here is no question of inappropriate delegation of legislative
 7 power” when “Congress . . . is implementing an inherent executive power.”).

8 There are innumerable statutes that authorize purely executive or administrative action with-
 9 out providing criteria that cabin the agency’s discretion.² Indeed, it long has been understood that
 10 Congress may commit certain decisions to the discretion of an administrative agency. The Adminis-
 11 trative Procedure Act, for example, precludes judicial review when “agency action is committed to
 12 agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). An action is committed to agency discretion by
 13 law if the statute authorizing the action “is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard
 14 against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” *Heckler v. Chaney*, 470 U.S. 821, 830
 15 (1985). But if the nondelegation doctrine always required Congress to supply an intelligible princi-
 16 ple, even when authorizing wholly nonlegislative action, then every statute that triggers
 17 § 701(a)(2)—which applies when there exist “no judicially manageable standards . . . for judging
 18 how and when an agency should exercise its discretion,” *Heckler*, 470 U.S. at 830—would be un-
 19 constitutional. No court ever has suggested such a novel rule, which would cut a swath through the
 20 United States Code.

21 Under these settled principles, the nondelegation doctrine has no application here because
 22 § 802 does not confer anything resembling legislative power on the Attorney General. “Legislative

23
 24 ¹ This is because when Congress “lay[s] down . . . an intelligible principle,” the “legislative action is
 25 not a forbidden delegation of legislative power,” *J.W. Hampton*, 276 U.S. at 409, since the legisla-
 tive power has been retained by Congress and the Executive merely is executing Congress’s will at
 Congress’s direction.

26 ² For just a few examples, see 5 U.S.C. § 515(a) (“[t]he Attorney General . . . may . . . conduct any
 27 kind of legal proceeding . . . which United States attorneys are authorized by law to conduct”); 5
 28 U.S.C. § 2680(e) (“[t]he Attorney General may compromise or settle any claim asserted” in a tort
 suit against a government employee); 28 U.S.C. § 526(a) (“[t]he Attorney General may investigate
 the official acts, records, and accounts” of specified federal officers); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a)(2) (“[t]he
 Government may elect to intervene and proceed with” a private relator’s False Claims Act suit).

1 power . . . is the authority to make laws.” *Springer v. Philippine Islands*, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928).
2 As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he true distinction . . . is between the delegation of power
3 to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring au-
4 thority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
5 cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.” *Field v. Clark*, 143 U.S. 649, 693-94
6 (1892) (internal quotation marks omitted). The core of Congress’s legislative power is the power to
7 promulgate binding rules of law. *See Yakus v. United States*, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1943) (“The essen-
8 tials of the legislative function are the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and
9 promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct.”). And the purpose of the nondelegation
10 doctrine is to ensure that when Congress delegates rulemaking or other quasi-legislative authority, it
11 “clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of
12 th[e] delegated authority.” *American Power & Light*, 329 U.S. at 105.

13 The rule that Congress may not delegate its “legislative power” is well illustrated by the only
14 two cases in which the Supreme Court has invalidated legislation as an unconstitutional delegation
15 of legislative authority to the Executive Branch. In *Panama Refining*, the Supreme Court struck
16 down § 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, which authorized the President by executive
17 order to prohibit interstate and international transportation of oil, and made it a criminal offense to
18 violate such an order. 293 U.S. at 406. The Court observed that § 9(c) “purport[ed] to authorize the
19 President to pass a prohibitory law” and that “the question whether that transportation shall be pro-
20 hibited by law is obviously one of legislative policy.” *Id.* at 414-15. Because Congress provided *no*
21 policy or standard to constrain the President’s discretion whether and in what circumstances to exer-
22 cise this lawmaking power, the Court concluded that Congress had “commit[ted] to the President the
23 functions of a legislature rather than those of an executive or administrative officer executing a de-
24 clared legislative policy.” *Id.* at 387-88. For similar reasons, the Court in *Schechter Poultry* struck
25 down § 3(a) of the same statute, which purported to give the President boundless authority to ap-
26 prove “codes of fair competition” for trades and industries. 295 U.S. at 521–22. The Court empha-
27 sized that the President’s authority under § 3(a) “involve[d] the coercive exercise of the law-making
28 power” because “[t]he codes of fair competition which the statute attempt[ed] to authorize [were]

1 codes of laws,” violations of which were “punishable as crimes.” *Id.* at 495. Because “the discre-
2 tion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of
3 trade and industry throughout the country, [was] virtually unfettered,” the Court concluded that “the
4 code-making authority thus conferred [was] an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.” *Id.*
5 at 541–42.

6 The Attorney General’s authority to file a certification under § 802 does not remotely resem-
7 ble the legislative power that Congress sought to confer upon the President in *Panama Refining* and
8 *Schechter*. Unlike the statutes at issue in those cases, § 802 does not authorize the Attorney General
9 to make law. In filing a certification in a particular case, the Attorney General does not promulgate
10 generally applicable rules of law or otherwise enact binding legislative standards. Rather, § 802
11 confers on the Attorney General authority to advise a court of the existence or nonexistence of cer-
12 tain facts related to the operation or non-operation of certain alleged programs. This is a quintessen-
13 tially executive, not policymaking, function. *Cf. Bateson v. Geisse*, 857 F.2d 1300, 1304 (9th Cir.
14 1988) (decision held to be “executive, rather than legislative” where it “neither applied to the general
15 community, nor involved the promulgation of legislative policy as a defined and binding rule of
16 conduct”).³

17 It is for this same reason that, as we explained in our opening brief (Dkt. 508 at 10–12),

18 ³ Nor, in this respect, does § 802 resemble even the statutes that have been *unsuccessfully* chal-
19 langed on nondelegation grounds. The nondelegation question arose in those cases because the un-
20 derlying statutes, unlike § 802, delegated rulemaking power. *See Whitman*, 531 U.S. 457 (statute
21 authorizing EPA to promulgate national ambient air quality standards); *Loving*, 517 U.S. 748 (statute
22 authorizing President to define aggravating circumstances for imposition of the death penalty in
23 courts-martial); *Touby*, 500 U.S. 160 (statute authorizing Attorney General to add drugs to schedule
24 of prohibited substances); *Mistretta v. United States*, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (statute authorizing Sen-
25 tencing Commission to promulgate Sentencing Guidelines); *Algonquin SNG*, 426 U.S. 548 (statute
26 authorizing President to impose quotas and license fees on imported oil); *Zemel v. Rusk*, 381 U.S. 1
27 (1965) (statute authorizing President to prescribe rules governing issuance of passports); *Knauff*, 338
28 U.S. 537 (statute authorizing President to prescribe rules governing entry and departure of aliens in
wartime); *Lichter v. United States*, 334 U.S. 742 (1948) (statute authorizing agencies to define “ex-
cessive profits”); *American Power & Light Co.*, 329 U.S. 90 (statute authorizing SEC to regulate the
structure of holding-company systems); *Yakus*, 321 U.S. 414 (statute authorizing price administrator
to promulgate regulations fixing commodity prices); *National Broad. Co.*, 319 U.S. 190 (statute au-
thorizing FCC to regulate airwaves); *United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp.*, 299 U.S. 304
(1936) (statute authorizing President to prescribe rules governing the sale of arms); *J.W. Hampton*,
276 U.S. 394 (statute authorizing President to increase or decrease trade duties); *Curran v. Wallace*,
306 U.S. 1 (1939) (statute authorizing Secretary of Agriculture to prescribe standards for sale of to-
bacco at auction markets); *Field*, 143 U.S. 649 (statute authorizing President to promulgate orders
imposing trade duties on imports).

1 Plaintiffs miss the mark when they argue that the Attorney General exercises legislative power be-
2 cause he “chang[es] the law applicable to these actions.” (Dkt. 482 at 15). It was Congress that al-
3 tered the rules governing Plaintiffs’ claims by creating a new form of immunity, and it was Congress
4 that made the broad-gauged judgment regarding the circumstances in which carriers should be im-
5 mune from certain types of allegations. *See Owens v. Republic of Sudan*, 531 F.3d 884, 889 (D.C.
6 Cir. 2008). Whether to file a certification in a particular case, by contrast, is not a question of legis-
7 lative policy. In filing a certification, the Attorney General neither creates new law nor repeals ex-
8 isting law; he merely invokes the new rule Congress created. Section 802’s title, “Procedures for
9 Implementing Statutory Defenses,” illustrates the point. Congress created the “statutory defenses,”
10 and § 802 prescribes how those defenses may be “implement[ed]” by the Court, the Attorney Gen-
11 eral, and the parties to the litigation. The Attorney General’s role under the statute is limited to de-
12 termining whether the criteria of § 802(a) are satisfied and, in appropriate circumstances, presenting
13 the relevant facts to the Court. The decision whether to file a § 802 certification with a court in
14 pending litigation in which the United States is an interested party is a basic executive function. *Cf.*
15 28 U.S.C. § 516 (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the
16 United States . . . is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of
17 the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General.”). In this sense, the Attorney
18 General’s authority under § 802 is similar to a decision to invoke a defense or immunity in litigation,
19 a function courts long have recognized as quintessentially executive. *See generally Buckley v.*
20 *Valeo*, 424 U.S. 1, 140 (1976) (“conducting civil litigation in the courts of the United States for vin-
21 dicating public rights” is a function that “may be discharged only by persons who are ‘Officers of
22 the United States’ within the language of [Article II, § 2, cl. 2]”). Because § 802 “[does] not in any
23 real sense invest the [Attorney General] with the power of legislation,” *J.W. Hampton*, 276 U.S. at
24 410, but instead authorizes him only to take traditionally executive action, the nondelegation doc-
25 trine is inapplicable and there is no requirement of an intelligible principle. *See Sunshine Anthracite*
26 *Coal Co. v. Adkins*, 310 U.S. 381, 399 (1940) (“Since law-making is not entrusted to the industry,
27 this statutory scheme is unquestionably valid.”).

28

1 **II. ALTERNATIVELY, § 802 PROVIDES THE REQUISITE INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE**

2 Even if the nondelegation doctrine did apply here, it would be satisfied because § 802 pro-
3 vides more than enough guidance to the Attorney General. The requirement of an intelligible prin-
4 ciple is rarely an obstacle. Not once since 1935 has the Supreme Court found an intelligible princi-
5 ple lacking, and to our knowledge, no finding of a nondelegation violation by a federal court of ap-
6 peals during that entire span has been sustained. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, it has “al-
7 most never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judg-
8 ment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.” *Whitman*, 531 U.S. at 474–75 (internal
9 quotation marks omitted). Thus, the intelligible-principle requirement does not require Congress to
10 impose detailed restrictions on an agency’s discretion. To the contrary, even the most general of
11 principles suffices. Since *Panama Refining* and *Schechter*, the Supreme Court has “upheld, without
12 exception, delegations under standards phrased in sweeping terms.” *Loving*, 517 U.S. at 771. These
13 include “various statutes authorizing regulation in the ‘public interest.’” *Whitman*, 531 U.S. at 474
14 (citing *National Broad. Co.*, 319 U.S. at 225–26; *New York Cent. Sec. Corp.*, 287 U.S. at 24–25).
15 Similarly, the Court found an intelligible principle in a statute authorizing the President to impose
16 quotas and fees on imports as he deemed necessary to ensure that they did not “threaten to impair
17 national security.” *Algonquin SNG*, 426 U.S. at 559.

18 The already lenient requirements of the nondelegation doctrine are further relaxed when, as
19 here, the agency’s discretion operates in a narrow field. *Whitman*, 531 U.S. at 475 (“[T]he degree of
20 agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power congressionally con-
21 ferred”). Indeed, if the field of discretion is sufficiently narrow, or if the area is one in which the
22 Executive has traditionally exercised independent authority, Congress need not provide *any* guid-
23 ance. *See id.* (“Congress need not provide *any* direction to the EPA regarding the manner in which it
24 is to define ‘country elevators’” (emphasis added)); *Loving*, 517 U.S. at 773 (Congress could dele-
25 gate power to the President to prescribe aggravating factors for imposition of the death penalty in
26 courts-martial “*without further guidance*” (emphasis added)). Section 802, which authorizes the At-
27 torney General to act only within a tightly circumscribed domain in which the President has tradi-
28 tionally exercised independent constitutional authority, easily satisfies the intelligible-principle re-

1 quirement.

2 **A. Section 802 Satisfies The Intelligible-Principle Requirement Because It Condi-**
3 **tions The Attorney General’s Discretion To File A Certification Upon Specific**
4 **Findings Of Fact**

5 The fact that the Attorney General may file a certification only upon finding that one of
6 § 802(a)’s factual predicates exists itself satisfies the nondelegation doctrine. By imposing this pre-
7 condition to filing a certification, Congress provided an intelligible principle to which the Attorney
8 General is directed to conform: He cannot file a certification unless he makes the necessary factual
9 finding. It therefore is not the case that § 802 provides “literally no guidance for the exercise of dis-
10 cretion.” *Whitman*, 531 U.S. at 474. That Congress specifically and narrowly defined the circum-
11 stances in which the Attorney General may act, and required him to make a specific factual finding
12 as a prerequisite to filing a certification, renders this case utterly unlike *Panama Refining*, in which
13 the Court held the statute infirm in part because it provided “no definition of circumstances and con-
14 ditions” in which the President was authorized to exercise the delegated power, 293 U.S. at 430, and
15 because it did “not require any finding by the President as a condition of his action,” *id.* at 415.

16 Any remaining discretion the Attorney General may retain whether to file a certification op-
17 erates in a very narrow field—the limited universe of lawsuits alleging provision of assistance to the
18 intelligence community by a particular category of defendants in which one of § 802(a)’s factual
19 prerequisites is met. Accordingly, this case is poles apart from *Schechter*, in which the findings that
20 conditioned the President’s power did not meaningfully narrow the field of his discretion, but in-
21 stead left him with a “wide field of legislative possibilities,” to the point that he had essentially “un-
22 fettered discretion to make whatever laws he [thought] may be needed or advisable for the rehabili-
23 tation and expansion of trade or industry.” 295 U.S. at 537–38; *see also Whitman*, 531 U.S. at 474
24 (*Schechter* was a case in which Congress “conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the
25 basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the economy by assuring ‘fair competition.’”).

26 Congress thus sufficiently cabined the Attorney General’s discretion by conditioning his
27 power to file a certification upon specific findings of fact. If Congress were required to further con-
28 strain the Attorney General’s discretion to file a certification even after having found a predicate
fact, scores of statutes would be invalid. Congress routinely authorizes agencies to take discretion-

1 ary action upon finding that a specified standard has been met, without specifying the factors that the
2 agency must consider in deciding whether to act. There are countless such statutes, of which we
3 have provided a small sampling in Appendix A to this brief. For instance, the Controlled Substances
4 Act provides that the Attorney General “may” temporarily add a drug to the schedule of prohibited
5 substances if he first finds that doing so is “necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public
6 safety.” 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(1). Just as here, the statute specifies the factors the Attorney General
7 must consider in making the predicate determination, *see id.* § 811(h)(3), but it does not separately
8 constrain the Attorney General’s discretion to decline to schedule a substance after having made the
9 predicate findings. Yet in *Touby*, the Supreme Court quickly rejected a nondelegation challenge to
10 this regime: “[O]ne could not plausibly argue that [the] ‘imminent hazard to the public safety’ stan-
11 dard”—structurally analogous here to the predicate factual determination FISAAA specifies in
12 § 802(a)(1)-(5)—“is not an intelligible principle.” 500 U.S. at 165.

13 As in *Touby*, courts routinely reject nondelegation challenges to statutes that merely author-
14 ize—not command—action upon determination that certain prerequisites have been met. *See Yakus*,
15 321 U.S. 414 (upholding statute conferring discretionary authority on price administrator to impose
16 price ceilings upon making specified finding); *Curtiss-Wright*, 299 U.S. 304 (upholding statute con-
17 ferring discretionary authority on President to ban sale of arms to countries upon making specified
18 finding); *New York Centr. Secs. Corp.*, 287 U.S. 12 (upholding statute conferring discretionary au-
19 thority on ICC to approve acquisition of a railroad upon making specified finding); *Freedom to*
20 *Travel Campaign v. Newcomb*, 82 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding statute conferring discre-
21 tionary authority on President to renew embargos upon making specified finding); *Michigan Gam-*
22 *bling Opposition v. Kempthorne*, 525 F.3d 23, 30–33 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (upholding statute conferring
23 discretionary authority on Secretary of Interior to acquire land for Native Americans); *Defenders of*
24 *Wildlife v. Chertoff*, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2007) (upholding statute conferring discretionary
25 authority on Secretary of Homeland Security to waive applicable legal requirements upon making
26 specified finding).

27 For purposes of applying the nondelegation doctrine, therefore, it does not matter whether
28 the Attorney General is *required* or merely *authorized* to file a certification upon finding that a fac-

1 tual predicate exists. Plaintiffs have relied on *Field* to argue that when Congress delegates authority
2 to the Executive to take certain action upon making specified factual findings—which they charac-
3 terize as “changing the law”—the delegation is permissible only if the findings trigger a mandatory
4 duty to act. (Dkt. 483 at 14–17). As an initial matter, the Attorney General’s findings under § 802
5 do not change the law. They do not, for instance, enact a prospective, generally applicable legal re-
6 quirement in any way analogous to the tariff requirements triggered by the President’s findings in
7 *Field*. See *supra* at 6–7; Dkt. 508 at 10–12. Like numerous other statutes, they do nothing more
8 than trigger application of the rule Congress enacted. See *Owens*, 531 F.3d at 891 (“The Supreme
9 Court has consistently upheld delegations, such as the one here, that predicate the operation of a
10 statute upon some Executive Branch factfinding.”); *supra* at 4 & n.2, 10, app. A. More fundamen-
11 tally, *Field* held that the mandatory duty in that case was a *sufficient* condition, not a *necessary* one.
12 See 143 U.S. at 693. *Field* did not hold that the only way to adequately constrain an agency’s dis-
13 cretion is to make the Executive’s duty to act mandatory; nor has any other case done so. Indeed, as
14 explained above, numerous cases have upheld statutes conferring discretionary authority on an Ex-
15 ecutive branch official. See *supra* at 9–10. *Field* itself observed that “[h]alf the statutes on our
16 books . . . depend[] on the discretion of some person or persons to whom is confided the duty of de-
17 termining whether the proper occasion exists for executing them. But it cannot be said that the exer-
18 cise of such discretion is the making of the law.” *Id.* at 694. Such a conclusion here would be a
19 radical departure from decades’ worth of settled jurisprudence.

20 **B. Any Discretion Exercised By The Attorney General In Deciding Whether To**
21 **File Certifications Is Further Constrained By § 802’s Core Purpose Of Protect-**
22 **ing National Security, And The Context In Which § 802 Was Promulgated**

23 The core purpose of § 802(a) and the context in which Congress enacted it further cabin any
24 discretion the Attorney General might have in deciding whether to file a certification. The Supreme
25 Court has long recognized that, in discerning whether Congress has provided an “intelligible princi-
26 ple,” courts should look beyond the plain language of the statute to “the purpose of the Act, its fac-
27 tual background and the statutory context.” *Lichter v. United States*, 334 U.S. 742, 785 (1948)
28 (quoting *American Power & Light Co.*, 329 U.S. at 104–05). *Lichter* and *American Power & Light*
endorsed consideration of a statute’s purpose even at a time “when the nondelegation doctrine actu-

1 ally had some vitality.” *Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Espy*, 58 F.3d 1367, 1384 (9th Cir. 1995),
2 *rev’d on other grounds*, 521 U.S. 457 (1997). This approach continues to guide the courts’ nondele-
3 gation inquiry today. *See, e.g., TOMAC*, 433 F.3d at 866. For example, in a series of cases, courts
4 have rejected nondelegation challenges to the Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”), a statute that on
5 its face appears to embody a standardless “tautology” that the Secretary of the Interior may acquire
6 real property interests “for the purpose of providing land for Indians.” *Michigan Gambling Opposi-*
7 *tion*, 525 F.3d at 30-31. In so doing, these courts have derived the necessary “intelligible principle”
8 from the statute’s “purpose,” “structure,” and “broader factual context.” *Id.* at 31–32.⁴

9 Here, any discretion the Attorney General might have in deciding whether to file a certifica-
10 tion is cabined by Congress’s purpose of protecting national security, which was critical to the im-
11 munity provision in two principal ways. First, Congress sought to address the concern that “without
12 retroactive immunity, the private sector might be unwilling to cooperate with lawful Government
13 requests in the future without unnecessary court involvement and protracted litigation.” S. Rep.
14 110-209, at 10. It observed that the “possible reduction in intelligence” that could result from this
15 delay is simply unacceptable for the safety of our Nation.” *Id.* Congress thus concluded that it was
16 appropriate to “exten[d] immunity” to electronic communication service providers that acted, if at
17 all, “on a good faith belief that the President’s program, and their assistance, was lawful.” *Id.* at 9.
18 Second, Congress recognized that “the identities of persons or entities who provide assistance to the
19 intelligence community are properly protected as sources and methods of intelligence.” *Id.* at 11. It
20 therefore enacted a procedure that “allows a court to review a certification as to whether an individ-
21 ual either assisted the Government pursuant to a lawful statutory requirement or did not assist the
22 Government, even when public disclosure of such facts would harm the national security.” *Id.* at 12.

23 These key legislative objectives guide any exercise of discretion by the Attorney General in
24 executing the immunity provision. And in so doing, they establish a substantive standard that is

25
26 ⁴ *See also Carcieri v. Kempthorne*, 497 F.3d 15, 42 (1st Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“[T]he historical con-
27 text of the IRA is important.”), *rev’d in part on other grounds*, 2009 WL 436679 (Feb. 24, 2009);
28 *South Dakota v. Dep’t of Interior*, 423 F.3d 790, 799 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e conclude that an intelli-
gible principle exists in the statutory phrase ‘for the purpose of providing land for Indians’ when it is
viewed in the statutory and historical context of the IRA.”).

1 plainly sufficient, when combined with the text, to satisfy the nondelegation doctrine. As noted
2 above, in *Algonquin SNG* the Supreme Court upheld a statute authorizing the President to impose
3 quotas and fees on imports as he deemed necessary to ensure that they did not “threaten to impair
4 national security.” 426 U.S. at 548. The Supreme Court also has upheld delegations that broadly
5 authorize agencies to act in the “public interest,” *American Trucking Ass’n*, 531 U.S. at 474, and in
6 *Freedom to Travel*, the Ninth Circuit rejected a nondelegation challenge to a statute that permits the
7 President to extend the embargo on trade with Cuba merely if doing so is “in the *national interest* of
8 the United States,” 82 F.3d at 1437-38 (emphasis added); *see also supra* at 8.

9 Moreover, with respect to the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion in these cases, there
10 can be no doubt that “the will of Congress has been obeyed.” *Yakus*, 321 U.S. at 425. It was this
11 very litigation that focused Congress’s attention on the broader policy question of whether and when
12 litigation should proceed in cases alleging the provision of assistance to the intelligence community,
13 and so these are the paradigmatic cases in which we know that a certification would achieve the pur-
14 poses of the Act. Indeed, Congress contemplated that certifications would be filed in these cases.
15 *See* S. Rep. No. 110-209, at 7 (citing the “more than forty lawsuits relating to [the media] reported
16 surveillance program [that] had been transferred to a district court in the Northern District of Cali-
17 fornia”); *id.* at 22; *see also* Letter from Attorney General Mukasey and Director of National Intelli-
18 gence McConnell to Harry Reid at 1 (June 26, 2008) (attached as Ex. 74, Dkt. 489). Under these
19 circumstances, it is wholly implausible to contend that the Attorney General had insufficient guid-
20 ance from Congress.

21 **C. These Considerations Are Clearly Sufficient To Satisfy The Intelligible-Principle**
22 **Requirement When, As Here, Congress Has Delegated Power To The Executive**
23 **In An Area In Which It Enjoys Independent Constitutional Authority**

24 The principles derived from the statutory text, structure and purpose of § 802 would satisfy
25 the nondelegation doctrine under any circumstances, but the constitutionality of § 802 is even more
26 clear because the President’s national-security powers are implicated. It is settled law that less is
27 required by way of an intelligible principle when Congress delegates power in the areas of national
28 security and foreign affairs, in which the Executive has independent constitutional authority. *E.g.*,
Loving, 517 U.S. at 772 (“[T]he same limitations on delegation do not apply where the entity exer-

1 cising the delegated authority itself possesses independent authority over the subject matter.” (inter-
 2 nal quotation marks omitted)); *Zemel*, 381 U.S. at 17 (“Congress—in giving the Executive authority
 3 over matters of foreign affairs—must of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily
 4 wields in domestic areas.”).⁵ Specifically, the President has independent constitutional authority “to
 5 classify and control access to information bearing on national security.” *Department of the Navy v.*
 6 *Egan*, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988). Whatever the metes and bounds of that authority as a general mat-
 7 ter, what it means for nondelegation purposes is that Congress could appropriately leave the Attor-
 8 ney General with discretion to determine whether it is advisable to make particular filings that will
 9 generally include sensitive national-security information. Simply put, because these cases involve
 10 national security and foreign affairs, Congress was authorized to legislate in the broadest of terms.
 11 *Cf. Knauff*, 338 U.S. at 544 (rejecting nondelegation challenge where “the Attorney General, exer-
 12 cising the discretion entrusted to him by Congress and the President, concluded upon the basis of
 13 confidential information that the public interest required that petitioner be denied the privilege of
 14 entry into the United States”).

15 **III. IF NECESSARY TO AVOID A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION, THE COURT**
 16 **SHOULD INTERPRET § 802 AS REQUIRING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO**
 17 **FILE A CERTIFICATION UPON FINDING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF**
 18 **§ 802(A) ARE MET**

19 Plaintiffs’ nondelegation argument is premised on a reading of § 802 that gives the Attorney
 20 General discretion whether to issue a certification after he has determined that the factual prerequi-
 21 sites are satisfied. For the reasons explained above, there is no substantial constitutional question
 22 here that need affect the Court’s interpretation of the statute. *See Algonquin SNG*, 426 U.S. at 560
 23 (“[W]e see no looming problem of improper delegation that should affect our reading of [the stat-
 24 ute].”). If, however, the Court concludes that there is any serious doubt about the constitutionality of

24 ⁵ *See also Knauff*, 338 U.S. at 543 (“[B]ecause the power of exclusion of aliens is also inherent in
 25 the executive department of the sovereign, Congress may in broad terms authorize the executive to
 26 exercise the power.”); *Curtiss-Wright*, 299 U.S. at 321 (emphasizing the “unwisdom of requiring
 27 Congress in this field of governmental power [foreign relations] to lay down narrowly definite stan-
 28 dards by which the President is to be governed”); *Freedom to Travel Campaign*, 82 F.3d at 1438
 (“Delegation of foreign affairs authority is given even broader deference than in the domestic
 arena.”); *United States v. Gurrola-Garcia*, 547 F.2d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1976) (“[T]he principle
 that Congress may delegate broad authority to the President in foreign affairs is clearly controlling
 law today.”).

1 § 802 under this reading of the statute, it can and must adopt a “fairly possible” construction of §
2 802 that would avoid any constitutional concern—namely, that § 802 *requires* the Attorney General
3 to file a certification if he finds the factual predicates for certification.

4 It is a “cardinal principle of statutory interpretation” that when the constitutionality of a
5 statute has been called into question, a court “must first ascertain whether a construction of the
6 statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678,
7 689 (2001); *see also Crowell v. Benson*, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). “This approach not only reflects
8 the prudential concern” against “needlessly confront[ing]” constitutional issues, *Edward J.*
9 *DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council*, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988),
10 but also “rest[s] on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend” the meaning “which
11 raises serious constitutional doubt,” *Clark v. Martinez*, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005). “It is therefore
12 incumbent upon [the Court] to read the statute to eliminate those doubts so long as such a reading is
13 not plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” *United States v. X-Citement Videos, Inc.*, 513 U.S.
14 64, 78 (1994). Courts cannot simply rewrite the plain meaning of statutes so that they “becom[e]
15 inoperative when they approach constitutional limits,” but they must adopt any “plausible”
16 construction that would avoid a serious constitutional concern. *Clark*, 543 U.S. at 381, 384.⁶

17 Here, § 802(a) does not expressly state whether certification is mandatory or discretionary. It
18 provides merely that a “civil action . . . shall be promptly dismissed, *if* the Attorney General certifies
19 to the district court” that at least one of the five criteria in § 802(a) has been met (emphasis added).
20 The Attorney General cannot submit a certification unless the standards of § 802(a) have been satis-
21 fied, and the word “if” simply reflects that these standards will not be met in every case. But noth-
22 ing in the statute specifies whether the Attorney General may decline to certify after determining
23 that a case is eligible for certification. The statute does not state, for instance, that the decision
24 whether to certify is committed to the “discretion” of the Attorney General. Nor does the statute use
25 permissive language, such as the word “may.”

26 _____
27 ⁶ Although an administrative agency may not avoid nondelegation issues by “declining to exercise”
28 a portion of the power delegated to it, *see Whitman*, 531 U.S. at 472–473, the power of courts to
avoid nondelegation questions by adopting a narrowing construction is well established, *see Mis-*
tretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n.7.

1 While Section 802 also does not specify that certification is mandatory, what is critical for
2 purposes of constitutional avoidance is that it fairly admits of that construction. Section 802(e) re-
3 fers to the “authority and *duties* of the Attorney General” (emphasis added). The use of the word
4 “duties” indicates that § 802 imposes some mandatory obligation on the Attorney General, but the
5 statute does not expressly identify which of the tasks it describes are mandatory. This ambiguity
6 could be resolved by reading § 802 as imposing on the Attorney General a “dut[y]” to certify if he
7 finds the predicate facts, if it were necessary to construe the statute in this way in order to save its
8 constitutionality. *See Duncan v. Walker*, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (courts must “‘give effect, if pos-
9 sible, to every clause and word of a statute’”); *United States v. LSL Biotech.*, 379 F.3d 672, 679 (9th
10 Cir. 2004) (courts must “strive to avoid constructions that render words meaningless”).

11 Interpreting § 802 to require certification when the Attorney General determines that the fac-
12 tual prerequisites are met finds further support in the longstanding rule that even expressly permis-
13 sive language empowering a public official to act may impose a mandatory duty when the legislature
14 intended the official to exercise that power in the public interest or for the benefit of a third party. In
15 the seminal case of *Supervisors v. United States*, the Supreme Court held that “where power is given
16 to public officers” and “the public interest or individual rights call for its exercise,” “the language
17 used, though permissive in form, is in fact peremptory.” 71 U.S. 435, 446–447 (1866). “In all such
18 cases, it is held that the intent of the legislature, which is the test, was not to devolve a mere discre-
19 tion, but to impose ‘a positive and absolute duty.’” *Id.* at 447. Thus, the Ninth Circuit has held that
20 “[w]here the public interest or private right requires that a thing be done permissive language is gen-
21 erally construed as being mandatory.” *Mullaney v. Hess*, 189 F.2d 417, 419–420 (9th Cir. 1951)
22 (statute requiring Tax Commission to pay tax refund “if approved by the Attorney General and the
23 Treasurer” was not discretionary; rather, “it becomes the duty of the Attorney General and the
24 Treasurer to approve” the refund “if the requirements of the statute have been fully met”). As dis-
25 cussed above, Congress enacted § 802 to further the public interest of protecting national security. It
26 also sought to protect the private right of carriers who either did not do what was alleged or acted in
27 good faith. S. Rep. 110–209, at 9–12. *Supervisors* and its progeny therefore support a mandatory
28 reading of the statute. *See also, e.g., United States Sugar Equalization Bd., Inc. v. P. De Ronde &*

1 *Co.*, 7 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1925) (where a company suffered a substantial loss as a result of actions
 2 taken at the behest and under the direction of the Department of Justice, Congress’s grant of “au-
 3 thori[ty]” to pay compensation required payment, despite the absence of mandatory language).

4 Courts have not hesitated to apply constitutional avoidance to statutory language that is far
 5 more expressly permissive than § 802. The statute in *Zadvydas*, for instance, provided that aliens
 6 subject to removal within 90 days “*may* be detained beyond the removal period.” 533 U.S. at 682
 7 (emphasis added). The Court noted that “while ‘may’ suggests discretion, it does not necessarily
 8 suggest unlimited discretion.” *Id.* at 697. “In that respect the word ‘may’ is ambiguous.” *Id.* The
 9 statute was therefore subject to a narrowing construction that avoided the constitutional problem
 10 otherwise posed by indefinite detention. *Id.* at 689. In *United States v. Witkovich*, the Court like-
 11 wise declined to adopt a “literal[]” reading of the phrase “as the Attorney General may deem fit and
 12 proper” because a narrower construction of the Attorney General’s discretion would avoid “constitu-
 13 tional doubts.” 353 U.S. 194, 195, 199 (1957). If the words “may” and “as the Attorney General
 14 may deem fit and proper” can be narrowly construed, then § 802(a) certainly can be.

15 To be sure, absent countervailing considerations, the broad discretion generally accorded the
 16 Executive Branch in matters of national security and foreign affairs might counsel in favor of inter-
 17 preting § 802’s ambiguous language as granting the Attorney General discretion. But because it is
 18 “fairly possible” for the Court to read § 802 as mandatory, the Court’s “plain duty is to adopt” that
 19 construction if necessary to avoid a serious constitutional issue. *Rust v. Sullivan*, 500 U.S. 173, 190
 20 (1991) (quoting *Blodgett v. Holden*, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring)); *see also*
 21 *United States ex rel. Madden v. General Dynamics Corp.*, 4 F.3d 827, 830 (9th Cir. 1993).⁷

22 CONCLUSION

23 For the foregoing reasons and those stated in our opening brief (Dkt. 508 at 10–14), § 802 is
 24 not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Executive Branch.

25
 26
 27 ⁷ Under such a construction, the Attorney General should retain discretion to decide *when* in the
 28 course of litigation to file a certification if he has determined that the standards of § 802(a) are satis-
 fied, and to decide whether to raise other defenses as an initial matter. But that sort of discretion is
 inherent in the executive function and would raise no conceivable nondelegation concern.

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Respectfully submitted,

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP
David W. Carpenter (pro hac vice)
Bradford A. Berenson (pro hac vice)
David L. Lawson (pro hac vice)
Edward R. McNicholas (pro hac vice)
Eric A. Shumsky #206164
1501 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005
Tel: (202) 736-8010
Fax: (202) 736-8711
bberenson@sidley.com

By: /s/ Bradford A. Berenson

Bradford A. Berenson

PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW
PITTMAN LLP

Bruce A. Ericson #76342
Jacob R. Sorensen #209134
Marc H. Axelbaum #209855
50 Fremont Street
Post Office Box 7880
San Francisco, CA 94120
Tel.: (415) 983-1000
Fax: (415) 983-1200
bruce.ericson@pillsburylaw.com

Attorneys for AT&T Corp.⁸

WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE
AND DORR LLP

Randolph D. Moss (pro hac vice)
Samir C. Jain # 181572
Brian M. Boynton # 222193
Catherine M.A. Carroll (pro hac vice)
1875 Pennsylvania Ave, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
Tel.: (202) 663-6000
Fax: (202) 663-6363
randolph.moss@wilmerhale.com

By: /s/ Randolph D. Moss

Randolph D. Moss

⁸ The submission of this brief does not constitute a waiver of any defenses that may be available to the AT&T, BellSouth or Cingular defendants, including, but not limited to, lack of personal jurisdiction or insufficient service of process. *See, e.g.*, AT&T Inc. Motion to Dismiss, No. 06-672 (Dkt. 79); Joint Case Management Statement, No. 06-1791 (Dkt. 61-1) at 51–52.

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MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
Henry Weissmann # 132418
Susan R. Szabo # 155315
Aimee A. Feinberg # 223309
355 South Grand Avenue
35th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Tel.: (213) 683-9100
Fax: (213) 683-5150
henry.weissmann@mto.com

Attorneys for the Verizon Defendants⁹

WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP
Brendan V. Sullivan, Jr. (pro hac vice)
John G. Kester
Gilbert Greenman (pro hac vice)
725 Twelfth Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005
Tel.: (202) 434-5000
Fax: (202) 434-5029
jkester@wc.com

By: /s/ John G. Kester

John G. Kester

Attorneys for Sprint Defendants¹⁰

DECLARATION PURSUANT TO GENERAL ORDER 45, § X.B

I, Marc H. Axelbaum, hereby declare pursuant to General Order 45, § X.B, that I have obtained the concurrence in the filing of this document from the other signatories listed above.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing declaration is true and correct.

Executed on February 25, 2009, at San Francisco, California.

By: /s/ Marc H. Axelbaum

Marc H. Axelbaum

Attorney for the AT&T Defendants

⁹ The submission of this brief is not a waiver of any defenses that may be available to the Verizon Defendants, including, but not limited to, lack of personal jurisdiction or insufficient service of process. *See, e.g.*, Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI, LLC Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 268); Joint Case Management Statement, No. 06-1791 (Dkt. 61-1) at 51–52. Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI, LLC continue to contest that they are subject to personal jurisdiction in the cases at issue in their motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (Dkt. 268).

¹⁰ The submission of this brief is not a waiver of any defenses that may be available to the Sprint Defendants, including, but not limited to, lack of personal jurisdiction or insufficient service of process. *See, e.g.*, Joint Case Management Statement, No. 06-1791 (Dkt. 61-1) at 51–52.

APPENDIX

SELECTED STATUTES AUTHORIZING EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS
TO TAKE ACTION PREDICATED ON FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS OR JUDGMENTS

Statute	Relevant Language
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 44303(b)	For acts of terrorism occurring between September 22, 2001 and May 31, 2009, the Secretary of Transportation “may certify that the air carrier was a victim of an act of terrorism and in the Secretary’s judgment, based on the Secretary’s analysis and conclusions regarding the facts and circumstances of each case, shall not be responsible for losses suffered by third parties . . . that exceed \$100,000,000, in the aggregate, for all claims by such parties arising out of such act.”
Atomic Testing Liability Act, 50 U.S.C. § 2783(c)	<p>“A contractor against whom a civil action or proceeding [for injury or loss due to exposure to radiation from an atomic weapons testing program contracted by the United States] is brought shall promptly deliver all processes served upon that contractor to the Attorney General of the United States. Upon certification by the Attorney General that the suit against the contractor is within the provisions of subsection (b) of this section [regarding exclusivity of remedy], a civil action or proceeding commenced in a State court shall be removed [to the applicable federal court].”</p> <p><i>See In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litigation</i>, 820 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding the statute against various constitutional challenges)</p>
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 824(d)	“The Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend any registration [to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance or list I chemical] simultaneously with the institution of proceedings under this section, in cases where he finds that there is an imminent danger to the public health or safety.”
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(e)	<p>“The Secretary [of the Interior] may, by regulation of commerce or taking, and to the extent he deems advisable, treat any species as an endangered species or threatened species even though it is not listed pursuant to this section if he finds that—(A) such species so closely resembles in appearance, at the point in question, a species which has been listed pursuant to such section that enforcement personnel would have substantial difficulty in attempting to differentiate between the listed and unlisted species; (B) the effect of this substantial difficulty is an additional threat to an endangered or threatened species; and (C) such treatment of an unlisted species will substantially facilitate the enforcement and further the policy of this chapter.”</p> <p><i>See United States v. Hill</i>, 896 F. Supp. 1057, 1059–62 (D. Colo. 1995) (rejecting non-delegation challenge).</p>

Statute	Relevant Language
Extension and Termination of National Emergency Powers Under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 5 note	The President “may extend the exercise of [already existing embargoes] for one-year periods upon a determination for each such extension that the exercise of such authorities with respect to such country for another year is in the national interest of the United States.” <i>See Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb</i> , 82 F.3d 1431, 1437 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding the statute against non-delegation challenge).
Federal Employment Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8121	“The Secretary [of Labor] may waive . . . for reasonable cause shown” the requirements that a claim for compensation for work related injuries contain certain information and be sworn to and “accompanied by a certificate of the physician of the employee stating the nature of the injury.”
Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o)(4)	“On the request of a State agency, the Secretary [of Agriculture] may waive the applicability of [the work requirement] to any group of individuals in the State [receiving nutrition assistance] if the Secretary makes a determination that the area in which the individuals reside (i) has an unemployment rate of over 10 percent; or (ii) does not have a sufficient number of jobs to provide employment for the individuals.”
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(g)(1)(A)	“[T]he court, upon request of the Attorney General, shall stay any request, demand, or order for discovery on the United States that the Attorney General certifies would significantly interfere with a criminal investigation or prosecution, or a national security operation, related to the incident that gave rise to the cause of action, until such time as the Attorney General advises the court that such request, demand, or order will no longer so interfere.”
Grain Standards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 77(a)(1)	The Secretary of Agriculture “may waive” the requirements regarding official weighing and inspection “in emergency or other circumstances which would not impair the objectives of this chapter.”
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1)	“Subject to [certain] numerical limitations . . . the Attorney General may, in the Attorney General’s discretion and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may prescribe, admit any refugee who is not firmly resettled in any foreign country, is determined to be of special humanitarian concern to the United States, and is admissible . . . as an immigrant under this chapter.”
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4)	“The refugee status of any alien (and of the spouse or child of the alien) may be terminated by the Attorney General pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may prescribe if the Attorney General determines that the alien was not in fact a refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42) of this title at the time of the alien’s admission.”

Statute	Relevant Language
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e)	<p>“[U]pon the favorable recommendation of the Director [of the United States Information Agency] . . . the Attorney General may waive the requirement of such two-year foreign residence abroad in the case of any alien whose admission to the United States is found by the Attorney General to be in the public interest.”</p> <p><i>See Abdelhamid v. Ilchert</i>, 774 F.2d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that the statute “does not expressly limit [the Director’s] discretion in deciding whether or not to make a favorable recommendation [to the Attorney General]”).</p>
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182e(c)	The Secretary of State “may waive” the prohibitions against issuing a visa to a foreign national involved in forced population control policies “if the Secretary (1) determines that it is important to the national interest of the United States to do so; and (2) provides written notification to the appropriate congressional committees containing a justification for the waiver.”
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1221(h)	The Attorney General “may waive” the requirements regarding the duties of departing and arriving vessels and aircraft to provide manifest information about each passenger, crew member, or occupant “upon such circumstances and conditions as the Attorney General may by regulation prescribe.”
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(C)(ii)	“The Attorney General may waive [the requirement that an alien found to have engaged in document fraud be deported] in the case of an alien lawfully admitted for personal residence if no previous civil money penalty was imposed against the alien [for the violation] and the offense was incurred solely to assist, aid, or support the alien’s spouse or child (and no other individual). No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision of the Attorney General to grant or deny a waiver under this clause.”
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(i)	“[T]he Attorney General may waive any other provision of section 1182(a) of this title [regarding classes of aliens ineligible for visas or admission] in the case of individual aliens for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest.”
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(d)(7)	“The Attorney General may waive the penalties imposed by this section with respect to an alien who knowingly” fails to present a document relating to the alien’s eligibility to enter the United States upon arriving in the United States, if, under specified sections of the same title, the alien “is granted asylum . . . or withholding of removal.”
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1442(c)	“The Attorney General may, in his discretion, upon investigation fully establishing the loyalty of any alien enemy who did not have an application for naturalization pending at the beginning of the state of war, except such alien enemy from the classification of alien enemy for the purposes of this subchapter, and thereupon such alien shall have the privilege of filing an application for naturalization.”
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1446(a)	“The Attorney General may, in his discretion, waive a personal investigation [otherwise required before a person may be naturalized] in an individual case or in such cases or classes of cases as may be designated by him.”

Statute	Relevant Language
Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, 10 U.S.C. § 433(b)	“If the Secretary of Defense determines, in connection with a commercial activity authorized pursuant [to the Secretary’s authority to authorize commercial activities necessary to provide security for intelligence activities abroad] that compliance with certain Federal laws or regulations pertaining to the management and administration of Federal agencies would create an unacceptable risk of compromise of an authorized intelligence activity, the Secretary may, to the extent necessary to prevent such compromise, waive compliance with such laws or regulations.”
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(2)	If a fishery has “historically processed the fish outside of the United States” and “the United States has a seafood safety equivalency agreement with the country where processing will occur,” the Secretary of the Interior “may waive” the requirement (for approval of “a limited access privilege program to harvest fish”) that “all fish harvested . . . be processed on vessels of the United States or on United States soil.”
National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d)(2)	“[T]he Secretary [of the Interior] may not grant to any Federal, State, or local agency or to any private individual or organization any right-of-way, easement, or reservation in, over, across, through, or under any area within the [National Wildlife Refuge] system . . . unless the grantee pays to the Secretary [fair market value or fair rental value]. If any Federal, State, or local agency is exempted from such payment by any other provision of Federal law, such agency shall otherwise compensate the Secretary by any other means agreeable to the Secretary . . . except that . . . the Secretary may waive such requirement for compensation if he finds such requirement impracticable or unnecessary.”
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 7426(e)	The Secretary of a department providing funds to be used in implementing a plan for the integration of education and related services provided to Indian students “shall have the authority to waive any regulation, policy, or procedure promulgated by that department that has been so identified by the entity or department, unless the Secretary of the affected department determines that such a waiver is inconsistent with the objectives of this subpart or those provisions of the statute from which the program involved derives authority that are specifically applicable to Indian students.”
Protect Our Children Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 17616(a)(3)(C)	“The Attorney General may waive, in whole or in part, the matching requirement” that is otherwise required under the statute to obtain funds remaining after grants have been issued “if the State or local [Internet Crimes Against Children] task force demonstrates good cause or financial hardship.”
REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note	“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall have the authority to waive all legal requirements such Secretary, in such Secretary’s sole discretion, determines necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and roads under this section.” <i>See County of El Paso v. Chertoff</i> , 2008 WL 4372693 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2008) (upholding statute against non-delegation challenge); <i>Save Our Heritage Org. v. Gonzales</i> , 533 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2008) (same); <i>Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff</i> , 527 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2007) (same); <i>Sierra Club v. Ashcroft</i> , 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44244 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2005) (same).

Statute	Relevant Language
Small Business Investment Act of 1958, 7 U.S.C. § 2009cc-8(c)(2)	“The Secretary [of Agriculture] may, in the discretion of the Secretary and based on a showing of special circumstances and good cause, permit the private capital of a rural business investment company . . . to be less than \$10,000,000[,] . . . if the Secretary determines that the action would not create or otherwise contribute to an unreasonable risk of default or loss to the Federal Government.”
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1641(c)(2)	Regarding permits for customs brokers, the Secretary of the Treasury “may,” if satisfied that the broker fulfills certain conditions, waive the requirement that the broker regularly employ at least one licensed person in a given district.
Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7207(a)(3)	<p>“The President may waive the application of paragraph 1 [forbidding the provision of U.S. government assistance] with respect to Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan to the degree the President determines that it is in the national security interest of the United States to do so, or for humanitarian reasons.”</p> <p><i>See Acree v. Republic of Iraq</i>, 370 F.3d 41, 64 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing the statute as an example of the “waivers that the President is routinely empowered to make”) (Roberts, J., concurring).</p>
USA Patriot Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(3)	Upon having reasonable grounds to believe that an alien is engaging in certain prohibited activities or “is engaged in any other activity that endangers the national security of the United States,” the Attorney General “may certify” the alien for detention until removal.
10 U.S.C. § 377(c)	The Secretary of Defense “may waive” the requirement that a civilian law enforcement agency that received support “reimburse the Department of Defense for that support,” if the support “is provided in the normal course of military training or operations” or “results in a benefit to the element of the Department of Defense . . . that is substantially equivalent to that which would otherwise be obtained from military operation or training.”
26 U.S.C. § 6325(b)(1)	<p>“Subject to such regulations as the Secretary [of the Treasury] may prescribe, the Secretary may issue a certificate of discharge of any part of the property subject to any lien imposed under this chapter if the Secretary finds that the fair market value of that part of such property remaining subject to the lien is at least double the amount of the unsatisfied liability secured by such lien and the amount of all other liens upon such property which have priority over such lien.”</p> <p><i>See E.J. Friedman Co., Inc. v. United States</i>, 6 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that “[t]he section commits the decision to discharge a lien to agency discretion, and the statute is drawn such that there is no standard against which to judge the IRS’s exercise of discretion”).</p>